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Preamble
In indigenous research projects, there is a strong emphasis 
on interviews and the analysis of the data that results. 
There is, however, another form of research that still calls 
to be fully acknowledged. Philosophical research shares 
some ground with empirical because it responds to a 
Maori history and experience of oppression. One clear 
area in which it may differ, though, is in how it attempts 
to acknowledge the presence of ‘things’, which we might 
call our ‘whanaunga’ (relations), even where these have 
been deemed by Western science to be inanimate. More 
importantly, philosophical research is risky because 
the thing continues to influence the researching self, 
despite the self’s eventual disengagement from the 
research. Philosophical research – the kind that seeks 
an unobtainable ground of thought – is at once aware of 
and tentative towards the thing. It also acts within the 
influence of the thing: this phenomenon for the author 
can be best felt when the bizarre is encountered in 
everyday observations.
Introduction
In an era in which we are strongly encouraged to 
undertake a self-conscious inquiry in order to ultimately 
construct knowledge – one might call this ‘researching for 
knowledge’ or simply ‘research’ – it seems strange to see 
the process through without a determined method. Not 
to have a method suggests a lack of a rigorous question, 
an uncertainty about what data one should approach, 
whom one should talk to and so on.
Indeed, whether it would constitute ‘research’ or not is 
debatable, given that it threatens to hold the self out 
against the world in a way that places the self somehow
at the mercy of things. Whilst those who are engaged 
with empirical research might claim that they, too, are in 
a state of uncertainty, it is my argument that, due to a lack
of strong method in what I shall call ‘conceptual’ or 
‘philosophical’ research, there is an even greater 
murkiness involved. One is led, as it were, primarily 
by feeling based on a perception of a thing, or of an 
association that the thing provides.
For Māori, the dilemma of whether there needs to be a 
method for philosophical research, quite apart from just 
‘thinking’, is even more fraught, because of an ethics 
involved with things in the world that Western researchers 
do not tend to identify. For Māori, the thing in its most 
basic sense is like the self: it is immediately connected 
to everything else, so discussion about ‘things’ itself 
constitutes some sort of materiality that links to the thing 
and the self. Thus, there must be an ethical way to even 
comport oneself towards things so that they are discussed 
in a way that does not constrain them. Yet, the very 
nature of academic research asks for a distance between 
self and thing, both in intention and in practice. In this 
article, I identify both the advantages and drawbacks of 
a proposed method for a consciously philosophical mode 
of inquiry: the revelation of the thing. This deliberate way 
of inducing thought has existed in various cultures for 
millennia. My purpose here is to describe the revelation 
of a thing as an impetus for thought, in a current context, 
in which colonisation, counter-colonialism, and a Māori 
metaphysics coalesce around a problem or concern.
It would be disingenous for me, in a Māori sense, not to 
declare my strong draw towards philosophical research 
and thus my vigorous advocacy for it. Indeed, I was 
probably always wanting to be there but was never aware 
that it existed. We might note here the German poet and 
philosopher Novalis’ words that “Philosophy is really 
homesickness – the desire to be everywhere at home” 
(Wood, 2007, p. 155). He really means that orthodox 
philosophy exposes the desire to find the absolute ground 
of all truth or existence but in this present scenario I feel 
that conceptual or philosophical research, for me, was the 
desire to be finally comfortable within a particular mode 
of thinking. Novalis was actually stating this ironically; he 
was saying that any such ground to truth or knowledge, 
even the pursuit of such, was a delusion. This delusion,
I shall describe later, is necessary for my own conceptual 
and philosophical Bildung or formation. The delusion, 
the pursuit of articulation whilst not being able to finally 
articulate, provides further provocation for thinking. It 
provides a schism between what is held out to be a real 
image of the thing and the inability to truly assert what
that real image is. It thus opens up a chasm in the ground 
of certainty; it forces the ground out from under one’s 
feet. This clearing, however, is not solely of my own 
making, although as I mentioned earlier, feeling and 
intellect do come to play on this generally dark ground 
of clarity. Thus, conceptual or philosophical research, 
drawing primarily on the faculty of ‘whakaaro’ for Māori, 
is like the withdrawn, quietly disturbing cousin that we 
see at family functions, brooding but nevertheless there. 
Its silence, I argue, merely underlies its importance for 
the expression of thought amongst things in the world.
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Thinking from the Influence of Things: 
Beyond the Self
If considered in a Kantian context, ‘whakaaro’ may be 
thought of as relating more to that initial uptake of an 
object, its intuition, rather than its final conceptualisation.
According to Smith (2000), whakaaro means “to cast 
attention to” (p.58) which he describes as an “activity 
of the stomach and the entrails”. ‘Whakaaro’ in this case 
refers to a much more primordial response to something 
and engages with a process that is not a participant in 
thoroughgoing reason. Indeed, Smith mentions that it is 
not rational thought as such, but rather a “basis of action”. 
Royal (2008) moreover notes the showing of the world to 
the self, evoking an emotional and spiritual response,
allowing the participant to understand something. It is 
in this understanding, perhaps, that one is moved to act 
in both subtle and deliberate ways, but it is important 
that the presentation of the world in all its complexity 
is preserved in that description. It is here also that we 
encounter the problem of Kant, whose influence in 
the Western world – and therefore on us, as colonised 
indigenous peoples – was every bit as great as Plato’s, 
Aristotle’s or Descartes’, and whom we must address to 
move away from a colonial belief that things are a pure 
moment of representation. Briefly put: Kant argued that 
there are two stages of cognition. The first, which is what 
I emphasise here, involved the intuition of a thing, given 
to us through space and time. This is a construction of the 
mind though our a priori intuition of space and time. We 
cannot see space and time. Things are presented in space 
and time: space and time are the most basic and abstract 
intuitions. We use them to come to understand that there 
is something there to begin with. Thus, according to Kant, 
space and time are thoroughly unavoidable and utterly 
constitutive through our own faculties (Janiak, 2012).
Whakaaro as both Royal and Smith describe it proposes 
something quite different for things in the world. To be 
sure, there is a process of the self in perception, but a 
huge difference lies in those writers’ speculation that 
there are two other aspects at play: the interaction 
of all things; and the possibility that things that are 
imperceptible in that very first instance may still have 
an effect on the self. Perception for Māori is here the 
antithesis of pure presence; it is the absence that Derrida 
notes as constitutive of what is acted on or, indeed, 
perceived (Biesta, 2010). Whatever we perceive as Māori, 
therefore, is comprised of what is not immediately there. 
‘Whakaaro’, if thought of abstractly, is a metaphor for 
acting on the distant – that which lies outside of perception 
– as much as on what lies before us in a Kantian sense. 
Furthermore, the initial representation of the world to 
us is an important one, not just the supporting actor for 
the lead role of knowledge, which is Kant’s second step 
of conception. In that important primordial act, the thing 
is orientated towards the self to the extent that the self 
becomes aware of it.
A huge gulf, though, exists between what Kant thinks 
of as the intuitions of space and time on the one hand, 
and Māori constructions of them, which are primarily 
affective, on the other. Here we reach an impasse with 
Kant’s proposal that whatever we perceive is presented 
to us within something a priori, because a possible Māori 
theory about space and time is that they have their own 
ability to present themselves as both substance and 
relation. Space and time in Māori are both referred to 
in the same word – ‘wā’ – and cannot be known, but this 
does not preclude them from ‘coming to bear’ on the self. 
Indeed, they possess some sort of self-arranging and 
impactful resonance.  Returning to the term ‘whakaaro’: 
a reciprocity between thing and self is established such 
that the thing, whether abstract or concrete, shows 
itself in some form to the self, who can then construct 
an idea about it. Most important in that statement, and 
marking a distinct divergence from Kant’s much more 
self-constructed representation of an object, is the role 
that the thing has in bringing the self to its attention. In 
a Māori worldview, things are not just passive entities 
awaiting construction by the self (Mika, 2014); they are 
instead animate and creative, having a much greater 
impact on the self than would be credited in dominant 
rational discourse.
Thus Māori may only have conceived of space and time 
to begin with because of those things’ ‘showing’ of 
themselves. Space and time in that interpretation are 
both a priori faculties (à la Kant) and, most importantly, 
in some indigenous beliefs are entities in their own right 
that even have some ability to construct us through their
manifestation. Space and time in this vein can be seen 
as active, discriminating participants that transcend mere 
innate human faculties in the term ‘whakawā’. ‘Whakawā’ 
has taken on the gloss of a judgement (the sort that 
takes place in a courtroom or by a public body) but there 
is also an original sense to the term of discernment or 
discrimination, through its much more connotative ‘to 
become divided in light of space and time’ ‘Whaka’ here 
refers to ‘to become’; ‘wā’ can mean a division but always 
collaterally with space and time unified. We see here the
possibility for ‘wā’ to point towards something beyond 
its usual static positing through much tighter dictionary 
definitions. ‘Wā’ moves here beyond the usual abstract 
notion of space and/or time and takes on aspects of a 
phenomenon that one aspires to (becomes). One has 
a measure of what space and time are in one’s mind, 
and has thus incorporated them as ideas, but they are 
simultaneously outside the mind; they have become 
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concerning entities that provide those ideas. The self 
is less making a self-asserting judgement and is more 
attuned to the possibility that time and space are 
coalescing around one’s cognitive faculty. 
Kant’s propositions about space and time are partially 
correct but the Māori notion of space and time is far more 
paradoxical than Kant allows for. A Kantian argument 
might therefore be levelled at my assertion above that 
‘wā’ is not really space and time; it is something else that 
is presented to us within Kant’s true intuitions. To be 
sure, a Māori worldview is that things arise not just from 
‘whakapapa’ as it is constructed, but from whakapapa 
itself as a participant in Papatūānuku or “rock foundation 
beyond expanse” (Marsden, 2003, p. 22): perhaps in this 
term or entity, then, lies Kant’s true definition of space 
and time. But again, ‘whakapapa’ cannot be divorced 
from ‘wā’ either. First, if conceived of as ‘genealogy’, 
then it draws on space (the gap between one generation 
and the next) and time quite necessarily. But even if we 
were to posit that whakapapa is somehow an a priori 
determining faculty, we soon discover to the detriment 
of that argument that whakapapa is immediately and 
inextricably enmeshed with the notion of ‘earth mother’ 
(Papa). This complicity – which is not really a complicity 
because whakapapa and papa are necessarily one and 
the same – draws the concept and all that participate in 
its primordial reach at once, meaning that space and time 
are collapsed and are thoroughly active.
Any apparently original and innate intuition that we posit as 
something merely cognitive, then, becomes simultaneously 
active thing that impacts on the self.  For the researcher, this 
contradiction is especially important when we are made 
to consider the possibilities that a single thing holds for us 
when we are moving seamlessly forward in finding answers 
to a question. With a more thorough and mysterious concept 
of the thing in mind, let us now turn to the potential for 
Māori philosophical research to reflect an ethical response 
that things in the world demand. 
The Provocation of a Thing
In line with an albeit modified version of Kant’s 
intuitions, it is the initial effect of the thing, I have just 
argued, that makes the greatest demands on us as Māori 
researchers, for it is their disclosure of themselves that 
brings us to speculate in the first instance. Rather than 
comprising a passive template from which one may 
move towards a sense of the world, then, whatever is a 
priori is made something else altogether in the Māori 
world beyond sheer abstraction. Things are therefore 
capable of provocation; they can ‘call forth’ – the sense of 
‘provocare’ – something in us through their own language 
or expression. They draw on the active nature of what we 
would call ‘wana’ or ongoing attunement and are not 
merely products of the mind. Kant’s intuitions in this 
instance are turned into something affective, in that they 
are more indebted to a Romantic notion of ‘the Absolute’2 
and are far less submissive to human agency. 
It seems perhaps unusual to imagine that humanity 
can be provoked into thought by a thing, because this 
suggestion posits the self within the influence of things 
rather than the converse. Yet this is precisely where Māori 
thought surpasses what Foucault(1989) insisted was the 
Western ushering in of man. Māori have long insisted 
that humanity is dependent on things in the world for the 
most original actions – even those things that lie beyond 
the immediate senses. One’s tribal saying, for instance, 
does not just state mountains, rivers, and other people 
as concepts because that replicates a detached view of 
those entities. Rather, there is a sense in these sayings 
that the self is only uttering those things’ names to begin 
with because of their manifestation. Confusingly, they 
are not necessarily present, not precisely consumable on 
the basis of their immediacy. They do, however, reside in 
the very utterance because of the self’s link with them. 
The self can be thought of as amongst those things whilst 
being constituted by them in some form beyond being 
the “present at hand” that Heidegger (1967a) warns 
against.
Thus, provocation for Māori may be both directly inciting 
and subtle. I shall turn to the sensory provocation soon 
and its implications for research, but let us continue 
with that more mysterious idea that what lies beyond 
the senses, for a Māori horizon of existence, has a say 
in how one shapes one’s thinking and, thus, research. 
No less stimulating than, say, a more material object 
(for instance, a person or a term), things in the distance 
display their influence through their interdependence 
with other things. The poet and philosopher Novalis 
indeed noted that “[a]ll bodily operations are an inverse 
thinking. What is thinking sensing etc. here – is burning, 
fermenting, thrusting etc. yonder” (Wood, 2007, p. 24). It 
can be speculated here that one’s thinking acts in direct 
conjunction with the interplay of things, to the extent that 
whatever is occurring with the mountain that one names 
in one’s saying has an effect on the self. The ontological 
aspect of the utterance in this form is in a thorough state 
of flux, even if the words themselves do not appear to have 
changed. In ‘casting attention to’, thought is at the same 
time unmoored from its apparently fixed foundations, 
with Takirirangi Smith (2000) continuing that whakaaro 
is an “activity of the stomach and the entrails”, where 
“the stomach is associated with the ira tangata aspect 
or earthly component of that which forms the basis of 
action” (p. 58). Alongside being an obviously emotional
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process, thought is a response to an essential call that 
coalesces around the ‘flaring up’ of a thing, near or distant. 
An eternal, unchanging property that allows a person to
think is less likely in this scenario; instead, something 
persists that the self is attuned to in some fashion. A 
thorough knowledge of this synchronicity is utterly 
elusive, but its continued draw to thinking is engaged 
with in Māori terminology and everyday practice.
The Term and the Bizarrely Unknowable: My 
Impetus for Speculation
This has special repercussions when one is thinking and 
writing about a philosophical concept. Often I have found 
it difficult to think about the term in its entirety because 
I encounter a limit of sorts. I suspect that this wall is 
actually the enormity of the term’s ontological sense. It 
is then that I realise that I can only talk about a concept 
partially, because the reason that I am thinking about 
it then and there is due to its influence on me. In other 
words, I am amongst the term as I struggle to think about 
it, and I only have access to speculation. This ‘withinness’ 
is relatable to my earlier discussions about whakapapa, 
which ensures my active participation amidst the term 
with all its uncertainty and absence/presence. Perhaps 
articulating the rift that I mentioned earlier – the 
mismatch between what appears to be the real thing and 
our inability to articulate the concept of it to its fullest 
extent – constitutes a method of speculation.
In that case, we could begin, say, a thesis with a method 
chapter explaining that phenomenon fully, and then 
outlining how this takes concrete form in an inquiry 
towards a problem. However, I understand this as only 
a temporary measure. One could never be absolutely 
certain when this rift takes place at every point. 
Identifying the rift, as Novalis puts it, would be like trying 
to “square the circle” (Kneller, 2003, p.168). There is 
nothing mystical in this notion of thinking at all; it is an 
everyday occurrence. It simply signifies that we are not 
as completely self-originating in conceptual research (or 
other types of research, for that matter) as academia and 
its backbone, rationalism, would have us think we are. It 
means that not everything is available to us. The thinker 
is therefore not outside matter; he or she is instead within 
it.  An example is appropriate here. Importantly, one’s 
version of how a thing manifests is highly personal. In my 
own research, I tend to think in words and language. My 
most meaningful thinking happens when I am writing; 
normally if I am thinking when not writing, it is about 
unconnected things. Like many Māori, I live in the world 
of the ironic most of the time. In fact, maybe we could 
argue that we live in the world of the fantastically bizarre 
when writing or researching philosophically, because 
paradoxes and ironies are presented to us so intensely in 
those situations. As I see potential in words (mainly indo-
European ones because of my inherent suspicion of them
although if I think hard enough I see them in Māori terms 
as well) my attention is snapped to a word or term. This is 
a deeply personal response, and others may be moved by 
something else altogether. I then consider what the word 
means (starting perhaps with its strict meaning but not at 
all limited to that); how the word might jar or accord with 
its ‘neighbours’ if there are any; what the word draws to 
it in terms of other words. I then turn to theorise about 
what it doesn’t so readily reveal through its dictionary 
definition and hence what the term carries with it 
regardless of its attributed meaning. Here, incidentally, 
is where I tend to differ in my (developing) view from 
the likes of Foucault, although remain to a certain extent 
aligned with the mainly German Romantic philosophers 
and, I believe, to a Māori ontology.
One term that I’ve been thinking about recently is the 
one currently under discussion: ‘research’. I suspect that 
when I move through a term I move through its influence, 
and the influence of other things, to a certain extent. So 
I’m never sure what will emerge. In this instance, I have 
certain suspicions about the term ‘research’, but I shall 
keep those in abeyance. If we look at the etymology of 
the term, we see it comes from the french ‘re’ which just 
means ‘intensely’, and ‘cercher’, which means to search 
(Onions, 1966). If we look at ‘to search’ we see that it 
has roots in the Latin ‘circus’ which means ‘to circle’. 
This doesn’t tell us much on its own, but it is clarified 
when we think about what it might proclaim within a 
worldview or worldviews. If I think about the term in light 
of ‘to search intensely’ then I would suspect that there 
is a metaphysics of selfhood at work, in which the self 
is projected as a certain ground of inquiry. There might 
be a topic of inquiry, to be sure, and I could say that this 
constitutes something that isn’t the self, but the topic 
of inquiry is absent from the etymology of the term. 
This strong selfhood in the term might persist even in 
kaupapa Māori research because of the ontology of the 
term ‘research’.
Admittedly we can only ever theorise about the nature of 
that ontology, and it is here that we might call this type of 
thinking ‘research’ if we wanted to. So if we return even 
earlier to the Latin we might get a sense of something less 
self-oriented if we wanted to. We simply see ‘an intense 
circling around’ of something. Again, my question would 
be: does the term allow the influence of other things in 
the world apart from the self? What I might theorise here 
is that one is circling because of the signposts of the 
external world – material, conceptual or non-cognitive. 
This construal could be a more palatable accord between 
the act of research in a Māori sense and the essence of 
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the term itself. 
Joining with the jolt from a word, the external world in its 
strangeness helps this process of thought. What moves 
one along in this sort of venture is a sense and observation 
of the bizarre. To this extent, I emphasise Camus’ (1964) 
suggestion that absurdity is the root of thought:
At any streetcorner the feeling of absurdity can strike any 
man in the face. As it is, in its distressing nudity, in its 
lightout without effulgence, it is elusive …. It is probably 
true that a man remains forever unknown to us and that 
there is in him something irreducible that escapes us (pp. 
10-11).
I advocate drinking coffee and people watching whilst doing 
conceptual research. This openness to the unknowable 
galvanises me to write without me knowing how. My lack 
of knowing can be thought of, in relation to my earlier 
philosophising of the Māori terms, in the following sense: I 
am drawn towards the uncertainty that whakapapa asserts 
in its connection with primordial Being; I am acted on by the 
self autonomy of other things and people in the sense of 
whakaaro; and I move towards those others with a particular 
concern that is constructed within those others’ residence 
in ‘wa’. As I am sitting here writing this paper, in a café on 
Davie Street, Vancouver, I look across the road.
There is a woman dressed in a fabulously outrageous 
outfit swinging around what look like two pieces of string 
with jandals attached to each. Meanwhile I am flitting 
between this paper and watching Victoria Wood’s ‘Acorn 
Antiques’ on YouTube. Quite what this does to contribute 
to my thinking I’m not sure, but it does something; 
I am immediately prompted again into theorising 
about what lies beneath the world of appearances. 
However, against the apparently mechanical nature of 
this process, Camus warns that “[t]he method defined 
here acknowledges the feeling that all true knowledge is 
impossible” (p. 12). Something steps forward for me: the 
surreal as a broad notion, and, thereafter, the capacity for 
one to disrupt the concept of the normal. Continuing with 
my current example: can the term ‘research’ act to disrupt 
the concept of ‘normal’ or is it complicit with it? I might then 
theorise the word in light of both its etymology and its more 
poststructural consequences. I might then write it up into 
an article or just allow it to percolate for a while. Here 
we have not just the guiding effect of the word: we have 
the guiding effect of the word alongside, for a moment at 
least, thorough surrealism.
Is Thinking in the Wake of Things a ‘Method’
Who could ever predict and pre-arrange where the rift 
occurs and how it is to present itself? One other point 
to be raised here is that, when one is presented with the 
surreal, there is a falling of sorts into that abyss. Is the 
uncertainty of one’s direction here related to the dark 
that is spoken of in our (Māori) metaphysics of creation? 
Quite possibly, especially when we consider that the 
Enlightenment – which we have certainly been colonised 
by – expects us to avoid the abyss at all costs. In terms of 
a method of certainty, Heidegger challenged Descartes 
on the basis of his assertion that a method is necessary 
to reveal very “first principles” (Newman, 1997, n.p.). 
Heidegger interprets this to mean that: 
This rule does not intend the platitude that a science 
must also have its method, but it wants to say that the 
procedure, i.e., how in general we are to pursue things 
(methodos), decides in advance what truth we shall seek 
out in the things. Method is not one piece of equipment of 
science among others but the primary component out of 
which is first determined what can become object and how 
it becomes object. (Heidegger, 1993, p. 300)
The ‘how in general’ we are to pursue things is the clincher 
here for Heidegger, not whether a method is qualitative, 
conceptual, empirical or kaupapa Māori. In thinking there 
has to be a way of determining, we have from the outset 
determined how those things are to appear. However, the 
converse may be true: that the ground of the question or 
inquiry determines how things are to appear. Perhaps in 
asking the fundamental question to be researched we 
have already necessarily presupposed a method. That is, 
one couldn’t have a question to be researched without 
already having anticipated that there will be a method 
attached. So perhaps it is not what comes first: maybe 
they coattend. What we can take from both method and 
inquiry is not merely a way of doing things (although this 
is what method has come to mean): it is the ontological, 
unconscious but very real expectation that objects will 
be determined in advance as ascertainable. Method and 
inquiry both open up a field of performance of both self 
and thing. Objects here may include ideas or intangible 
concepts, not just solid things.
There is quite possibly a problem here for Māori. 
Heidegger (1967b) noted that this predisposition 
towards things characterized an impoverishment in 
the West, beginning since Plato (whom we must thank 
for rationalism). The self was in a state of deprivation 
because it was denied an inquiry into Being, according 
to Heidegger.  But unlike Māori, he didn’t figure on the 
possible detriment that this predisposition would involve 
for things in the world. Some of his predecessors, I would 
add, certainly had. But to return to my earlier speculation: 
if we are always in amongst the world as Māori, through 
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the myriad of connections that we claim to have through
various terms and descriptions, then there might be an 
effect on other things besides the self (but including the 
self) of a method. To be sure, I am entering outrageous 
and dangerous territory because I am suggesting that our 
orientation towards a thing has effects on that thing. This 
is particularly outrageous for a participant in academia to
suggest, because philosophically it means that a number 
of phenomena occur that cannot be perceived. In the 
words of Kant, and the much later Carnap (Friedman, 
2000), one can say nothing of this sort of metaphysics. 
Nor should one, according to the Academy. To do so is 
anti-empiricist. However, I am not the first to do this: if we, 
for instance, put the whare tapa wha model – a relatively 
empirical Māori framework of health - through some 
phenomenological paces, then we discover that how we
intend a thing to exist has consequences for that thing, 
given the interconnectedness that the model expressly 
highlights.
Conclusion
The vast majority of Māori researchers appear to be 
undertaking interviews, a phenomenon that Cooper 
(2014) has noted rests on a presumption of what authentic
research is meant to be. There are metaphysically ethical 
considerations in that specific research method that are 
pertinent for Māori, including the possibility that the free 
form of a thing is constrained by our preconfiguring of 
it; the regard of Māori speech from interviews as ‘data’, 
and so on. The darker research that I have called for in 
this article – the spaces of obscurity where ‘whakaaro’ 
is called by things to speculate but not necessarily 
penetrate into – is the diminished relative. It originates 
from the ability of the self to philosophise, but from 
the paradoxical position that one is in the first instance 
cognizant of a thing through that thing’s choice. This 
draw towards the thing can be expressed through a 
number of Māori terms, including whakaaro, whakapapa, 
and wa, even if these terms have been overwhelmingly 
represented as not related to everyday events. In this 
sort of research there is the wonderful potential for a 
dual personal creativity and political liberation. The only 
data here may be one image, term or feeling, and even 
that ‘fact byte’ is thoroughly unknowable and crucially its 
own master. The provocative word, the man in the luridly 
coloured lavender wig, the self’s reflection in a window: 
all have the potential in some form or other to coalesce 
around one’s own speculative responses. This delight in 
the thing’s mercuriality may, in turn, promise a counter-
colonial answer, for it is in the lack of certainty in this 
kind of thinking that the colonizer might be, if not dealt 
with, at least put in some place of confusion themselves. 
This glee at the absurd – which is at the same time deadly 
serious – can best be summed up in the following quote 
of Hōlderlin (2002), a German Romantic poet, who also 
saw the need to encounter a realm of shadows in his 
thinking:
[W]e delight in flinging ourselves into the night of the 
unknown, into the cold strangeness of any other world, 
and, if we could, we would leave the realm of the sun and 
rush headlong beyond the comet’s track. (p. 10)
1 See for instance Maffie (n.d.) who argues that “[t]ime-space is   
 concrete, quantitative, and qualitative” (n.p.).
2 For further discussions on the Romantic ideas about the Absolute/  
 Being, see: Stone (2011); Frank (1997); Beiser (2003). The Absolute  
 is both substance and absence that gives rise to impressions and   
 ideas as much as to concrete phenomena
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